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Stratton: The Slip and Fall Case in Montana

THE SLIP AND FALL CASE IN MONTANA AND THE
DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AS APPLIED
IN ACCIDENTS IN THE SUPERMARKET
THE SCOPE OF SLIP AND FALL LIABILITY
IN THE SUPERMARKET
The character of modern supermarkets, their method of self-service
selection, the nature of the products they sell, and the manner in which
those products are displayed has created a unique dilemma in the law
circumscribing landowner liability. For example, to merely show that
the plaintiff has suffered a slip and fall does not prove that the defendant was negligent. To prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant failed in his duty to keep the store premises in a reasonably
safe condition.
In some cases, the plaintiff can prove by direct evidence that the
defendant supermarket was actively negligent or had actual notice of
the hazard causing the accident. Often, however, the conduct of another patron is an intervening cause of the hazard, and the defendant
supermarket is liable only if it is chargeable with constructive notice
of the hazard.'
To provide evidence sufficient for a court or jury to charge the
defendant with constructive notice, the plaintiff must rely primarily
on circumstantial evidence. 2 But the greatest difficulty for the plaintiff,
especially in a jurisdiction like Montana,3 is a specific requirement by
the courts that he show how long the hazard was present.
To avoid the difficulty of coming forward with sufficient circumstantial evidence to construct a prima facie case, plaintiff's counsel have
attempted to interject into the liability formula doctrines of res ipsa
loquitur and strict liability. These overtures have been rejected by the
courts. 4 Nonetheless, in this orbit of supermarket slip and fall cases,

traditional tort principles have been challenged and changed in a few

'This is the majority rule and is applied in all jurisdictions. See Annot., Liability
of Proprietor of Store, Office, or Similar Business for Injury from Fall Due to
Presence of Litter or Debris on Floor, 61 A.L.R. 2d 6 (1958) [hereinafter cited as

61 A.L.R.2d].
22 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW

OF TORTS, §

19.4, at 1072 (1956)

[hereinafter cited as

HARPER & JAMES], which reads:

While circumstantial proof may afford an inference of negligence, though
equivocal in the sense described in the last paragraph [equivocal to the specific
acts of negligence], yet it must cover all of the necessary elements of negligence to make out a prima facie case on that issue. Failure at this point is a
common shortcoming, which often springs from a lack of careful attention to
the substantive requirements of negligence. In a great many types of cases
there is a two-fold aspect of these requirements which is sometimes lost sight
of in proof.
3Rossberg v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 110 Mont. 154, 162, 99 P.2d 979, 981 (1940).
'See, e.g., Jones v. Jarvis, 437 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Ky. 1969).
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jurisdictions. Plaintiff's attorneys have convinced the courts that certain
areas of the supermarket, primarily the vegetable stand, are morE
hazardous, and the proprietor of the supermarket should be held to
5
higher standards of care.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the traditional concepts of
landowner liability as they have been applied in Montana, to illustrate
current changes in the law created by the supermarket slip and fall
decisions recently handed down by other jurisdictions, 6 and to discuss
their validity.
THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW APPLICABLE
TO ALL OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND
Slip and fall cases are governed by the rules of law which define
the duties and liabilities of landowners to those persons who are business invitees. 7 Landowner duties and liabilities are expressed separately.
The landowner owes a duty to invitees to "exercise ordinary care to see
that the portions of the premises which the invitee may be expected to
use are reasonably safe." If the hazards are obvious to the invitee or if
the landowner gives warnings to the invitee of the presence of the
danger, the landowner has discharged his duty and he is absolved from
liability.9
On the other hand, the landowner is liable for a dangerous condition
on the premises if-but only if-it
is established that: 1) the condition
was one created by or under the authority of the proprietor, or one in
connection with which the proprietor is shown to have participated;
2) the proprietor had actual notice of the conditions; 3) the condition
existed for such a period of time that in the exercise of ordinary care
the proprietor should have known of it and taken reasonable steps to
correct it. 10
Terminology is material to understanding the analysis of the legal
principles of landowner liability as they are applied specifically to slip
and fall accidents in the supermarket. The proprietor of a supermarket

5

Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 221 A.2d 513 (1966).
cases are discussed under the subheading STRICTER VIGILANCE IN

Other

THE SUPER-

MARKET AND THE DOCTRINE OF WOLLERMAN v. GRAND UNION STORES,
INC., infra.

qRain water in the supermarket is one sphere of new development which is beyond
the scope of this comment. However, it should be pointed out that this is an area of
tort law which is moving toward strict liability for slip and fall accidents. See 5
WILLAMETTE L. J. 353 (1969); 18 DRAKE L. REV. 136 (1968).

7

See 61 ,A.L.R. 2d §§ 1-3 at 11-18.
'Id. § 2 at 13.

(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343 (b) at 215 (1965). See also Id. § 343, comhiht a at 216. Montana expressly recognized the proposition that the landowner discharges his duty if he warns the invitee of the danger in Regedahl v. Safeway Stores,

ORESTATE3MENT

Inc., .149 Mont. 229, 233, 425 P.2d 335, 337 (1967). See, e.g., O'Dell v. Cook's
Market, Inc., 432 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Mo. 1968).
-Paraphrased from. 61 A.L.R. 2d at 13. See 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed.

1940).
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is actively negligent when he or someone under his control has participated in the creation of the dangerous condition. If the dangerous
condition was created by someone other than the proprietor, the proprietor will be negligent if he has actual notice of the hazard and has failed
to correct the condition promptly: a failure to render his business
premises safe is passive negligence. If the hazard has remained uncorrected
for a sufficiently long period of time, even though the proprietor
neither created the hazard nor had actual notice of the hazard, he is
deemed to have constructive notice of the hazard. His negligence in this
instance is predicated upon his failure to discover the hazard within
a reasonable period of time; it is a second form of passive negligence.
THE LAW IN MONTANAA DICHOTOMY IN THE CHAIN OF PRECEDENT
The Montana Supreme Court has decided few cases in which the
liability of the landowner for slip and fall accidents has been discussed.
There are no Montana cases in which the Court has been confronted
with a slip and fall accident inside a supermarket. 1 Several decisions
have analyzed slip and fall accidents which have occurred in circumstances sufficiently analogous to conditions inuring to accidents in super2
markets and from which applicable legal rules may be distilled.1
The case law of Montana acknowledges two discernible chains of
precedent applicable to landowner liability: in one chain of precedent,
the Court's conclusions turn on the presence or absence of active negligence or actual notice;"3 in the other chain of precedent, 14 the Court's

"The Court has considered several cases arising out of slip and fall accidents in parking lots made hazardous from accumulations of snow and ice. These cases are easily
distinguishable on their facts and do not illuminate landowner liability for slip and
falls occurring within the store. See Luebeck v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 152 Mont. 88,
446 P.2d 921 (1968); Tigh v. College Park Reality Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57
(1967).
"As previously limned, slip and fall cases are within the purview of the landowner's
liability generally. Any analysis of Montana law must reflect the general principles
of law applicable to landowner liability and specific rules deduced from the firm
application of these general rules.
"Wells v. Stanley J. Thill & Ass'n, Inc., 26 St. R.ptr. 152, 452 P.2d 1015 (1969) ; Dean
v. Fir§t Nat'1 Bank of Great Falls, 152 Mont. 474, 452 P.2d 402 (1969); Suhr v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 152 Mont. 344, 450 P.2d 89 (1969); Luebeck v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 152 Mont. 88, 446 P.2d 921 (1969); Pushard v. J. C. Penney Co., 151 Mont. 82,
438 P.2d 928 (1968); Tigh v. College Park Reality Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57
(1967); Clark v. Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, 406 P.2d 822 (1965); Vogel v. Fetter
Livestock Co., 144 Mont. 127, 394 P.2d 766 (1964); McIntosh v. Linder-Kind Lumber
Co., 144 Mont. 1, 393 P.2d 782 (1964); Kerns v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 138 Mont.
249, 356 P.2d 127 (1960); Zimmer v. California Co., 174 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mont.
1959); Cassady v. City of Billings, 135 Mont. 390, 340 P.2d 509 (1959); Milasevich
v. Fox W. Mont. Theatre Corp., 118 Mont. 265, 165 P.2d 195 (1946); Chichas v. Foley
Bros. Grocery Store, 73 Mont. 575, 236 P. 361 (1925); Montague v. Hanson, 38 Mont.
376, 99 P. 1063 (1908).
"Matson v. Northern Hotel, Inc., 152 Mont. 103, 446 P.2d 913 (1969); Clark v. Worrall,
supra note 13; Rossberg v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 3; MeEnaney v. City
of Butte, 43 Mont. 526, 117 P. 893 (1911). See also MONTANA JURY INSTRHCTION
GUIDE No. 120.04 [hereinafter cited as M.J.I.G.].
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judgment rests almost exclusively on facts which denote the presence
or absence of constructive notice. 15
CASSADY v. CITY OF BILLINGS
AND ROSSBERG v. MONTGOMERY WARD & CO.
Cassady v. City of Billings'6 and Rossberg v. Montgomery Ward &
Co. are the two leading cases in Montana. Cassady is generally utilized
by the Court when the facts of the principal case require discussion of
active negligence or actual notice. The case phrases the law in terms
of the duty owed by the landowner to the business invitee.' 8 The following language is most often cited by the Court as stating the rule
in Montana:
17

It is well-established in Montana that a landowner is obligated

toward an invitee to either use ordinary care to have the premises
reasonably safe, or to warn the invitee "of any hidden or lurking
danger therein." Milasevich v. Fox Western Montana Theatre
Corp., 118 Mont. 265, 270, 165 P.2d 195, 197 see Restatement, Torts,
Negligence, § 343. He is not an insurer against all accidents and
injuries to such persons while there. Milasevich v. Fox Western
Montana Theatre Corp., supra.10
A number of recent cases have appropriated this language from the
Cassady case, and it may now be said to be the majority rule in Montana. 20 Several recent decisions have not specifically cited Cassady,

although these cases do employ language which is similar to the language found in Cassady.2 ' This discrepancy is insignificant and does not
distract from the apparent willingness of the Montana court to follow
Cassady as the leading decision.
When it discusses the doctrine of constructive notice, the Montana
court relies on the precedent first established in McEnaney v. City of
Butte22 and later affirmed in Rossberg. In the Rossberg decision the

Court explained:
From the evidence heretofore outlined and well-settled law, it is
clear that the plaintiff, in order to prove negligence on the part
of the defendants, must show that the defendants placed the oil

' 6Regedahl v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra note 13 and Clark v. Worrall, supra note 13
are two exceptions to this statement. M.J.I.G. No. 120.04, supra note 14, also expresses
both concepts, duty and liability, of the basic principle of law. Failure to cite
accepted Montana authority made McIntosh v. Linder-Kind Lumber Co., supra note 13,
an anomalous decision and one which is difficult to classify.
6135 Mont. 390, 340 P.2d 509 (1959).
"Supra note 3.
"When the duty concept is cited alone, the requirements for establishing liability may
be obscured and overlooked as part of the law.
"Cassady, supra at 393, 340 P.2d at 510.
'Wells v. Staney J. Thill & Ass 'n, Dean v. First Nat 'I Bank of Great Falls and Suhr
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra note 13. Regedahl v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra at 223,
425 P.2d at 337, cites Cassady but relies on that decision solely for the principle that
the landowner's duty of keeping the premises reasonably safe is discharged by giving
notice of the hazard to the invitee.
'Pushard v. J. C. Penney Co., Tigh v. College Park Reality Co., and Kerns v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., supra note 13; Matson v. Northern Hotel, Inc., supra note 14.
"Supra note 14, 43 Mont. at 531, 117 P. at 894.
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or foreign substance on the floor, or had knowledge of it being there,
or that it was on the floor such a length
23 of time that the defendants should have known of its presence.
In decisions which have resorted to the Rossberg precedent, the Court
has strictly required the plaintiff to demonstrate the length of time the
24
hazard has existed.
Because of the recency of both Matson v. Northern Hotel, Inc. and
Clark v. Worral, it may be concluded that Rossberg is viable precedent
and not disturbed by the Cassady group of decisions. The Rossberg decision should be controlling precedent for future slip and fall accidents
2"
occurring in the supermarket.
FROM McENANEY ON-THE DOCTRINE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AS APPLIED IN MONTANA
The cases following the precedent of constructive notice in McEnaney are not unique and coincide with judgments from other jurisdictions decided upon similar factual questions. However, the Montana
court has demonstrated a greater readiness to demand rigid compliance
with the requirements for proving constructive notice. This places on
the plaintiff a severe burden, a conclusion which may be substantiated
by the failure of any plaintiff to prove sufficiently a prima facie case
for constructive notice. The plaintiff's difficulty is finding enough circumstantial evidence to prove a definite period of time.
For example, in the McEnaney case the Montana court reversed a
district court decision holding for the plaintiff. 26 The plaintiff had
alleged that the City of Butte was negligent in allowing an accumulation
of snow and ice to form on a public sidewalk and that the defendant had
full knowledge of the hazard at all times. 27 The Court answered:
The notice may be actual or constructive. The celerity of action is
necessarily dependent upon the attendant circumstances in each
case .... but mere knowledge, without any reasonable opportunity
to act does not determine liability. In this class of cases, therefore,
liability depending, as it does, upon notice of the alleged unsafe
condition and the failure to exercise ordinary care to remedy it,
it is necessary to allege facts showing notice at a sufficient interval
before 28the injury, to give the defendant reasonable opportunity
to act.

The Court tested the pleadings of the plaintiff by the rule and found
them insufficient because the time period was not proved: "Was this
' 29
period of time an hour, or a day or a month?

'Rossberg, supra at 169, 99 P.2d at 985.
'See discussion of McEnaney and Clark v. Worrall infra.
'The validity of this statement rests on the plethora of slip and fall cases reported in
which constructive notice must be proven. See generally 61 A.L.R. 2d at 6.
Supra at 526, 117 P. at 893.
2Id. at 532, 117 P. at 894.
2Id.
2Id.
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The Rossberg decision reviewed one of the few slip and fall accidents
which occurred within a store and which was caused by a negligent act
of someone other than an employee. It affirmed McEnaney.30 Together
these are the only decisions in Montana in which the Court discusses
the relationship between the proof and the requirement that it establish
31
a definite time lapse.
In the Rossberg case, the plaintiff was walking through the basement
of the defendant store when she slipped and fell on what appeared to be
a pool of oil. 3 2 There was no evidence other than the testimony of an
employee of the defendant as to statements made by him twenty days
after the accident to the effect that the oil spill had been there long

33
enough to have been cleaned up.

The Court refused admission of the employee's statements on the
basis that they were hearsay and not part of the res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule. 34 However, the Court in dictum considered the statements
as though they were admissible and determined that they had no probative value.3 5 The Court dismissed the statements made by the employee
because "absolutely no time is fixed as to when the oil was spilled, or
' 36
how long it was on the floor prior to the accident.
The fundamental stress which the Court places upon the requirement
that a time lapse be established is not without merit. Unless and until a
time lapse is proven, the jury has no function. The Court explained
in Rossberg:
The function of the jury in such cases is to determine, once the
length of time the oil had been on the floor is ascertained,

whether or not the defendants
had sufficient notice as to its
37
existence to have removed it.

*'Rossberg, supra at 169, 99 P.2d at 985.
'In Clark v. Worrall supra at 382, 406 P.2d at 826, the Court considered an instruction
given by the lower court structured on the language in Bossberg and upheld the instruction as stating exactly the legal requirements for demonstrating constructive
notice.
'Rossberg, supra at 160, 99 P.2d at 981.
'Id. at 161, 99 P.2d at 981.
'Id. at 162, 99 P.2d 981.
'Id. The Court said:
The statement it had been there long enough to be cleaned up is not the
equivalent to an admission that it was there long enough to impute negligence
because it had not been cleaned up. If it was there for one minute, it was
there long enough to have been cleaned up; but the question was whether it
was there long enough so that not discovering it and cleaning it up constituted
negligence.
36
1d.
..
Rid.
MId.at 163, 99 P.2d at 982. The Court related this example:
...Suppose a traveler on a highway were to collide with an obstacle thereon,
and later reported his collision to another person who had never before seen
the obstacle, knew not how it had gotten on the highway and did not see the
collision, and he were to exclaim, "That obstacle has been there long enough
to have been removed." By what process of reasoning or even guessing could
a jury ascertain how long the obstacle had been on the highway? It is evident that such a statement, if actually made would be without meaning as
having no foundation to support it, and as not tending to show negligence.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/3
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the jury can only speculate on the
If the time lapse is not ascertained,
38
notice.
constructive
of
question
The Court settled the rule of law in Montana to mean that the
plaintiff must show the "defendants placed the oil or foreign substance
on the floor or had knowledge of it being there, or that it was on the
floor such a length of time that the defendants should have known of
'39
its presence.
The Rossberg decision states the complete doctrine of landowner
4
liability. It is the only case to do so in absolute terms. "
41
In the case of Clark v. Worrall, the Montana Supreme Court
rendered an exceedingly narrow decision, considering only what constitutes sufficient evidence to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proving
constructive notice. 42

The setting of the accident was a bowling alley during a tournament. The plaintiff brought forward evidence to prove that the floors
had not been cleaned since 4:00 P.M. and that there were large crowds
in the alley the night of the accident. The person designated to clean
on
the alley testified that he did not know of any spillage and debris
'43
the floor, but that such spillage and debris was " 'to be expected'.
The Court rebuked the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was
negligent by failing to warn her of the dangerous conditions created
by the wet slippery floors. The Court held that in Montana the duty
to warn the invitee goes only to hidden or lurking dangers; the invitor
44
The Court believed that it was
is not an insurer against all accidents.
common knowledge that floors are slippery when wet and that debris
45
The Montana Court, recogsuch as cellophane makes the floor slippery.
nized as correctly stating the law an instruction which reiterated the
46
language of Rossberg.

Id. at 169, 99 P.2d at 985.
cites Montague v. Hanson, 38 Mont. 376, 99 P. 1063 (1908)

0
I Rossberg

that the landowner is not an insurer of the safety of his patrons.

for precedent

He only has the

duty to exercise ordinary care to keep his premises reasonably safe. Rossberg, supra
at 170, 99 P.2d at 985.
"146 Mont. 374, 406 P.2d 822 (1965).
42The

facts of this case are noteworthy because other jurisdictions have considered

analogous situations and have found active negligence on the part of the defendant.
Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35 So. 2d 720 (1948); Bern v. Greyhound Parks of Arizona, Inc., 5 Ariz. App. 483, 428 P.2d 147 (1967); Bozza v.
Voranado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 200 A.2d 777 (1964).
"Clark v. Worrall, supra at 378, 406 P.2d at 824.
"Id. at 380, 406 P.2d at 825.
ibId.

"Id. at 382, 406 P.2d at 826. The instruction read:
If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff fell by reason of debris or
some foreign substance on the floor, you are instructed that the plaintiff, in
order to prove negligence on the part of the defendant must show that the
defendant placed the debris or foreign substance on the floor or had knowledge of it being there, or that it was on the floor such a length of time that
the defendant should have known of its presence.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1969

7

1970]

Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 3
THE SLIP AND FALL CASE

The lower court had denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
and the Supreme Court affirmed. This is particularly significant in light
of the ascertainable time which the hazard may have existed. However,
evidence was introduced to the effect that the large crowds made clean
up impossible, and the Court may have found this to be exoneration
from the duty to clean up the spillage and debris within a reasonable
48
time.
A more recent decision in which the Court applied Rossberg is Matson
v. Northern Hotel, Inc.48 The case did not involve a slip and fall, but the
Court found the facts sufficiently analogous to require a showing of
proof that the defendant had constructive notice of the hazard. 49 The
facts of the Matson case are unusual. The plaintiff was an entertainer
and had just finished his show before a large banquet audience. He
was hot and tired; carrying several heavy instruments, he asked to use
the service elevator in order to avoid the crowd leaving by the main
elevators. When he pulled together the service elevator inner cage
doors, his hand slipped and was crushed between the closing doors.
There was evidence produced at the trial which indicated that there
was usually a strap attached to the upper door of the cage which
was missing at the time of the accident.
The Supreme Court analyzed the facts of the case and reached the
conclusion that no proof was produced which demonstrated that the
defendant Hotel had knowledge of the absence of the strap. This deficiency of proof was fatal to the plaintiff's case. The Court held:
The general rule is that a proprietor of premises may not be held
liable for injuries resulting from a defect in the premises, if such
defect was not caused by the proprietor, but was of such character
as to come about without his knowledge. See Clark v. Worral, 146
Mont. 374, 406 P.2d 822, Rossberg
v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
110 Mont. 154, 99 P.2d 979.50

The Matson case also contained the following statement of dictum
by the Court: Speaking for the Court, Castles, J., opined, "[c]ertainly
the missing strap would likely come about without the proprietor's
knowledge, and there is simply no evidence of a failure to inspect." 5'

"7In the case of Food Town Stores, Inc. v. Patterson 282 Ala. 477, 213 So.2d 211 (1968)
:the Alabama Supreme Court held a defendant supermarket liable for its failure to

keep the premises reasonably safe. In this case, the supermarket produced evidence
that a stockboy had swept the floor near the vegetable stand 10 minutes prior to the
accident alleged. However, there was evidence that six or seven customers had stopped

to pick out fruit and vegetables. The court believed that this was sufficient evidence
to have put the supermarket on notice that a hazard could have been created.
"152 Mont. 193, 446 P.2d at 913 (1969).
'Id. at 109, 446 P.2d at 916.
5Id.

'Id. at 110, 446 P.2d at 916.
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This comment is the first indication in any decision in Montana in which
the Montana Court has intimated that the failure to inspect could con5-2
stitute an independent ground for finding the defendant negligent.
McINTOSH V. LINDER-KIND LUMBER CO.AN ELIPTICAL DECISION
In 1964 the Montana Supreme Court handed down a very abstruse
decision in McIntosh v. Linder-Kind Lumber Co. 53 An analysis of the
facts does not resolve the question on what legal theory the case was
decided.
The facts of the case are simple. The plaintiff was visiting a lumber
yard to purchase roofing material. In an effort to avoid being struck
by a truck driving through the lumber yard, she took several steps
backwards. Backing into a sharp edge on a roll of tin lying on the
ground, she lost her balance and fell. There is no evidence in the
case which suggests how the roll of tin was left where it was.
In the McIntosh decision the Court did not cite familiar language
from prior Montana case law, and in fact it looked to foreign case
law for support of propositions for which there was ample Montana
54
authority.
The Court offered the following comment:
The true ground of liability is his superior knowledge over that of
business invitees of the dangerous condition and his failure to give

warning of the risk, however, he is not an insurer
55 against all accidents which may befall them upon his premises.

The Court holds the following facts to be operative and determinative in the case:
Here, the proof showed that the plaintiff entered upon the defendant's premises to purchase roofing, that while there, and in an
effort to not be hit by a vehicle using the passageway, she was
cut by a piece of tin causing her to fall and suffer the injuries
testified to at the trial ....56
From the discussion reported in the case, the Court appears to apply
a doctrine of res ip. a loquitur in the decision without acknowledging
57
that it is in fact doing so.

5

"Failure to inspect is passive negligence, but if a defendant's failure to inspect is
demonstrated, this may be sufficient evidence for a jury to find either (1) constructive notice or (2) active negligence in the store's operating. methods. See Food Town
Stores, Inc. v. Patterson, supra note 48.
1144 Mont. 1, 393 P.2d 782 (1964)..
"Id. at 6, 7, 393 P.2d at 785.
5Id. at 6, 393 P.2d at 785.
Id. at 7, 393 P.2d at 785.
"7An analysis of the case points up the inconsistencies in the reasoning of the Court.
The fact that the plaintiff is able to prevail on a showing which is essentially no more
than that a slip and fall occurred, indicates an adoption of res ipsa loquitur by the
Court. However, this construction is opposed to other language in the case.
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However, McIntosh was reviewed by the Court in Regedahl v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. 58 The Court concluded: "While this is indeed the underlying
reason or policy for the liability it is not intended to be the fully
articulated rule or final test. "" The Court in this case affirmed as
correctly stating the law, M.J.I.G. No. 120.04.0 Based on the Court's
recognition of the limits of McIntosh, it is reasonable to conclude that
the McIntosh decision did not disturb prior precedent in Montana. 61
To date, the law in Montana remains unaltered and unamended. The
principles of law, although expressed by two separate lines of precedent
follow an unbroken chain of application, and there is little indication
that the Montana Supreme Court will alter the relevant precedent in the
future.
STRICTER VIGILANCE IN TIIE SUPERMARKET AND THE
DOCTRINE OF WOLLERMAN v. GRAND UNION STORES, INC.
In 1952 the Superior Court of New Jersey decided the case of Simpson v. DUffy. s 2 At that time the New Jersey courts considered the possibility of embodying in the law of landowner liability the principle that
the proprietor of a supermarket owed a more vigilant duty to exercise
ordinary care because of the greater risks of injury in and around the
63
vegetable stand.
By 1966 the Supreme Court of New Jersey sought to reevaluate its
prior position that the proprietor of the supermarket owed no greater
duty than to exercise due care. In the case of Wollerman v. Grand
Union Stores, Inc.64 the court recognized:
That someone was negligent seems clear enough. Vegetable debris
carries an obvious risk of injury to a pedestrian. A prudent
man
would not place it in an aisle or permit it to remain there.65
The Court in Wollerman ascertained three sources which could have
created the hazard: 1) carelessness in the manner in which the supermarket displayed its produce; 2) carelessness in the handling of the
produce by an employee; 3) carelessness of another patron.6 6 The Court
recognized that the plaintiff is not in a position to know precisely what
the cause of the hazard was and concluded.:67

5149 Mont. 229, 425 P.2d 335 (1967).
OId. at 234, 425 P.2d at 338.
wId. at 229, 425 P.2d at 337.
"This conclusion is further supported by all subsequent decisions in which the Court
has not declared McIntosh as precedent or as significantly altering the law.
119 N.J. Super. 339, 88 A.2d 520 (1952).
"Id. at 348, 88 A.2d 525. The Court concluded that such a policy would create strict
liability for slip and fall accidents and for that reason rejected the theory of higher
duty of care. See also 61 A.L.R. 2d at 15.
-47 N.J. 426, 221 A.2d 513 (1966). The facts of the case are simple. The plaintiff
slipped and fell on a string bean. No other significant evidence was introduced by
the plaintiff.
"Id. at 428, 221 A.2d at 514.
"Id. at 429, 221 A.2d at 515.
"Id.
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[Ijt is appropriate to require the defendants to come forward with
proof of the measures they took6 8 to deal with the probability that
litter would fall and accumulate.

Upon first inspection, the New Jersey court's decision in Wollerman
speaks in terminology much like that found in the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur,6 9 although the Court does not state expressly that it is adopting
70

that doctrine.

The effect of the decision in Wollerman is to create a "presumption
of active negligence." '71 In application, the presumption creates, in the
absence of proof by the defendant of his due care, an inference for the
jury that he was probably negligent.72 The presumption obviates the
evidentiary requirement that the defendant prove actual or 7constructive
3
notice to avoid dismissal after presenting his case in chief.
The presumption of active notice differs from the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur not so much in form as in its application. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur requires that both the inspection and control of the
cause of the injury be excusively in the hands of the defendant.74 Of course,
exclusive

control

is

not

possible in a self-service

supermarket

where

'Id. at 430, 221 A.2d at 515. The New Jersey Court stated:
We appreciate that these views do not square completely with the standard
approach to the problem [citing Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 6 (1958)], but we are
satisfied that where a substantial risk of injury is implicit in the manner
in which a business is conducted, and on the total scene it is fairly probable
that the operator is responsible either in creating the hazard or permitting
it to arise or to continue, it would be unjust to saddle the plaintiff with the
burden of isolating the precise failure. The situation being peculiarly in the
defendant's hands, it is fair to call upon the defendant to explain if he
wishes to avoid an inference by the trier of facts that the fault probably
was his.
See Kahalili v. Rosecliff Reality, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 141 A.2d 301 (1958).
Several law review recent decisions have classified the Wollerman decision as announcing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See 20 ARK. L. REV. 404 (1967); 18 W.
RES. L. REV. 1015 (1967); 35 FORDHAm L. REV. 375 (1966); 12 VILL. L. REV. 396
(1967). Although the Court in Wollerman does not expressly state that they are
approaching a concept of res ipsa loquitur several of the cases cited as authority in
that decision are res ipsa loquitur decisions. See Kahalili v. Rosecliff Reality, Inc.,
supra note 68; Francois v. American Stores Co., 46 N. J. Super. 394, 131 A.2d 799
(1957); Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 262, 139 A.2d 404 (1958).
7If the New Jersey Court were to have adopted the concept of res ipsa loquitur, they
would be required to overturn Simpson v. Duffy, supra, as valid precedent. The fact
that Wollerman looked to the Simpson v. Duffy case for authority is indicative
of an intention not to fully accept the substantive provisions of rces
ipsa loquitur.
"For lack of a better description, the legal consequences of the Wollerman decision
are termed a presumption of active negligence.
"Wollerman, supra at 429, 221 A.2d-at 515.
"In its operation, the presumption requires the defendant to put on proof of his satisfactory methods of conducting his business. The presumption technically raises an
issue of fact, as any other presumption does, for the trier of the facts. If the defendant fails to come forward with evidence, he risks an adverse verdict grounded
upon the presumption of negligence. This prevents the defendant from aborting the
lawsuit at the end of the plaintiff's case in chief upon a motion for directed verdict.
71See 9 WIGMOR] ON EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940); 2 HARPER & JAMES § 19.5 at
1051; PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS at 218 (3d ed. 1964). See also Wold,

Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine in Montana, 29 MONT. L. REV.-199 (1968);
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS of
§ 328
D, at 156,
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by ScholarWorks
at University
Montana,
1969157

(1968).
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there may occur intervening negligence by a patron. 75 The presumption of active negligence places the burden of going forward with
evidence on the defendant to demonstrate that he was exercising the
proper degree of due care to keep his premises reasonably safe. It does
not shift the burden of proof.
If the defendant comes forward with evidence and disputes the presumption, the plaintiff to prevail must then prove all the elements of
his cause of action, including the presence of either actual or constructive
notice.76
77
Only three other jurisdiction have cited the Wollerman decision,

and solely as precedent for the concept that the vegetable stand area
of the supermarket demands a greater vigilance to meet the standards
of ordinary care. 78 None of these jurisdictions has adopted either the
Wollerman presumption of active negligence or res ipsa loquitur.79
Many jurisdictions have recently required the supermarket to exercise greater care to keep the area around the vegetables reasonably

have continually refused to apply res ipsa loquitur on the theory that in the
supermarket no one person may be said to have exclusive control.
71This analysis is substantiated by Panko v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 403 F.2d 62, 64 (3d
Cir. 1968). In this case the Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the Federal District
Court for the District of New Jersey. The lower court properly applied the Wollerman
decision when it said:
In our matter, the Defendant did come forward and present proof; so that I
conclude that Wollerman is inapposite to the instant case.
See also HARPER & JAMES § 19.11, at 1100-1102.
7Morton v. Lee, 450 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1969); Stract v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 35
Wis. 2d 51, 150 N.W.2d 361 (1967); Rhodes v. El Rancho Markets, 4 Ariz. App. 183,
418 P.2d 613 (1966).
7Morton v. Lee, supra at 960; Stract, supra at 57, 150 N.W.2d at 364; Rhodes, supra
at 185, 418 P.2d at 615. Rhodes appeared to adopt the Wollerman presumption of
active negligence; the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The case again
appeared before the Arizona Appellate Court in 1969, Rhodes v. El Rancho Markets,
9 Ariz. App. 576, 454 P.2d 1016 (1969) on appeal from a verdict for the defendant.
On appeal, the Arizona Appellate Court had the opportunity to reaffirm Wollerman,
but it failed to do so, and cited as authority RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS §
343. 9 Ariz. App. at 583, 454 P.2d at 1021. Furthermore, the court expressly refused
an instruction structured on the principles of res ipsa loquitur. Id. It appears that
the Arizona Court has moved away from its initial courtship of the concepts in
Wollernan.
15Courts

"Morton v. Lee, supra at 960; Stract, supra at 56, 150 N.W.2d at 364; Rhodes v. El
Rancho Markets, supra at 583, 454 P.2d at 1021. No state has adopted either res ipsa
loquitur or strict liability. See generally 61 A.L.R.2d at 6. It is of some interest
to ascertain that the case of Carl's Market, Inc. v. De Feo, 55 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1951)
has been rolled back and the specially concurring opinion by Terrill, J. in that case,
disapproved of in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trussell, 131 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1961). See
Super Market liaibity: Problems of Proving the Slip and Fall Case in Florida,18 U.
FLA. L. Rxv. 440 (1965) See also 61 A.L.R.2d., supra at 15.
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safe. Thus, when there is evidence on the part of the defendant supermarket of active negligence in the manner in which they conducted
their business, a question of fact is raised and must be submitted to the
80
jury.
The question is moot as to whether those jurisdictions recognizing
a higher degree of duty (without accepting a doctrine of r~s ipsa
loquitur) have eased the plaintiff's burden of proof. The effects of the
courts' decisions may be otiose. Nevertheless, no jurisdiction has made
this principle of more vigilant care binding on any area outside of the
vegetable stands.8 '
CONCLUSIONS
The jurisdictions which have expressed that the supermarket is
subject to a higher degree of care to keep the vegetable stands reasonably safe are in the minority. In these jurisdictions, the facts of the
cases have peculiarly indicated the presence of active negligence by the
5 2
supermarket in the methods of maintenance or merchandizing.
These cases should be criticized for two very basic reasons. First,
the law of landowner liability has always been that he owes the duty of
ordinary care to keep the premises reasonably safe. Ordinary care is
ordinary care under the circumstances. Recognizing that there are greater risks created by the method of self-service marketing of produce, the
care required is increased. Therefore, these cases previously discussed
have accomplished no more than a restatement of the law as it currently
reads.
Second, the presence of active negligence is a sufficient issue to be
presented to the jury and does not require contortion to ascertain some
higher risk and thereby avoid the requirement that the plaintiff prove
notice. There is a distinct and absolute difference between proving
active negligence and proving a notice requirement. To prove the
former does not require disproof of the latter.
The Wollerman case should also be criticized, but for different reasons.
Undoubtedly, the Wollerman decision shifts the burden of going forward
8OColonial Stores, Inc. v. Turner, 117 Ga. App. 331, 160 S.E.2d 672 (1968); Food Town

Stores, Inc., v. Patterson, supra note 53; Safeway Stores, Inc., v. Keef, 416 P.2d 892
(Okla. 1966); Bush v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 416 S.W.2d 247 (Mo. 1967); Contra,
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 53 A.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Joye v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464, (4th Cir. 1968); Rumsey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
276 F.Supp. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Bogart v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 31 A.D.2d 685,
295 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1968); Lofton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 So.2d 189 (La. 1968);
Jones v. Jarvis, 437 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1969); German v. Kienow's Food Stores, 246
Ore. 334, 425 P.2d 523 (1967). See also 17 Defense L. J. at 119-122, 323-325, 581-584
(1968); Serinto v. Borman Food Stores, 380 Mich. 637, 158 N.W.2d 485 (1968);
Romeo v. Jumbo Market, 56 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967).
a Several jurisdictions have upheld verdicts on a demonstration of active negligence on
the part of the defendant in the conduct of his business. Colonial Stores v. Donovan,
115 Ga. App. 330, 154 S.E.2d 659. (1967); Francois. v. American Stores Co., supra
.note 70; Swartz v. Warick-Philadelphia Corp., 424 Pa. 185, 226 A.2d 484 (1967).
"See cases cited supra note 81.
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with evidence from the plaintiff to the defendant. This .presumption
creates an issue :of fact by its very operation unless the Court deems
that it has been disputed and the presumption disappears.83 If the case
is given to the jury to decide, the defendant stands the greater probabil84
ity of suffering an adverse judgment.
The Court in Wollerman expressed that the plaintiff was not in
position to know what exactly caused the hazard- and this was the
rationale for shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence
to the defendant.8 5 This shift in the evidentiary procedure merely
required the defendant to illustrate his operating methods.8 6 It did
not require the defendant to prove the cause of the hazard, but only
that he probably was not negligent.
Realistically, in the absence of active negligence, the defendant
supermarket is in no better position than the plaintiff to explain to
7
the jury the cause of the accident. With the Rules of Civil Procedures
now generally in effect, the plaintiff through the rles granting discovery
may ascertain-for himself whether the supermarket was exercising proper
due care.88 The Rules of Civil Procedure can accomplish the same results as the presumption of active negligence does in the Wollerman
decision, but without risking the adverse verdict to the defendant by a
sympathetic jury.
The Montana Court has on several prior occasions demonstrated
that it will decide slip and fall cases conservatively.89 Before the Court
will allow a jury to determine the issue of negligence when the plaintiff
is alleging constructive notice, the plaintiff is required to establish the

'Panko v. Food Fair Stores, Inc. supra note 77. See HARPER & JAMES § 19.11 at
1100-1102.
14HARPER & JAMES § 19.5 at 1801, which reads:
. . . Since juries incline heavily toward plaintiffs the net practical effect of
the doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is to shift the burden of loss from unexplained
accidents of these types from plaintiffs to defendants.
'Supra at 429, 221 A.2d at 514.
"Id. at 430, 221 A.2d at 515. If a question of fact is raised, courts hesitate to remove
the case from the jury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment f, at
160 (1965). For Montana law, see McIntosh, supra, at 8, 393 P.2d at 786.
O'See REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1947 § 93-2701 and Rule Nos. 26, 31, 33, 34 contained therein.
'Supermarkets now keep accurate time sheets of when the store was swept and by
whom. The plaintiff may have access to these sweeping sheets, lists of employees on
duty at the time of the accident, reports of the adjusters and a list of witnesses by
proper use of the Rules of Procedure for discovery. This is probably all the evidence available to the defendant also.
'Matson, supra note 49; Clark v. Worrall, supra note 13; Rossberg, supra note 3;
MeEnaney, supra note 23. For example, in Clark v. Worrall, supra at 378, 406 P.2d
at 824, the Court held that it is common knowledge that (1) tile floors are slippery
when wet, and (2) a piece of paper such as cellophane would cause the floor to be
slippery also. If this logic is extended to supermarkets, the plaintiff would be charged
with knowing that the area around the vegetable stand is hazardous and slippery.
The effect of Clark v. Worrall is to place upon the plaintiff notice of the hazard
and the duty to exercise reasonable care or otherwise face an inference that he was
contributorily negligent.
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specific time lapse.90 Consequently, the Montana Court cannot adopt a
theory of res ipsa loquitur without creating a significant break with
established rules and without completely altering the direction signaled
in its prior precedent.
On the other hand, the Montana Court is not limited by current
precedent from requiring greater vigilance of a supermarket proprietor
when the operative facts of the case require a greater degree of care.
As presently stated, the law of.Montana is fully adequate to meet the
institutional requirements of future factual situations in slip and fall
accidents.
REX B. STRATTON, III.

"0Id. Clark v. Worrall, Rossberg and McEnaney. In Matson, supra note 52, the Court

noted that failure to inspect was not alleged. This is an indication that the failure
to inspect by a supermarket may be negligence per se in some certain circumstances.
However, this is essentially an issue of active negligence and should not be confused
as disturbing the evidentiary burden resting with the plaintiff which requires him

to prove all the elements of his cause of action.
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